By D. Cockburn
This ebook differs from others through rejecting the dualist procedure linked particularly with Descartes. It additionally casts severe doubt at the sorts of materialism that now dominate English language philosophy. Drawing particularly at the paintings of Wittgenstein, a relevant position is given to the significance of the inspiration of a person in our considered ourselves and others.
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Extra resources for An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind: Souls, Science and Human Beings
We can see this by focusing on one of the objections that I raised in the previous section. Assume that we have strong evidence for the claim that for a period the individual’s visual perspective on the world was from a point outside the physical body. My question is: should this lead us to say that for that period the person was (or it is likely that she was) situated at a point outside her body? To draw this conclusion we would need to have independent grounds for the following claim: people are (generally) situated at that point from which their visual perspective on the world is.
Now, in normal circumstances we do, of course, take the fact that I was at a certain place at a certain time as explaining the knowledge that I have of what happened there. In a particular case, however, this would be no explanation at all if it were discovered that I had lost my eyes, ears and so on before going there. Would it, then, be an explanation if I had, temporarily, ‘lost my body’? 3. A tension in our thought In the previous section I threw every argument I could think of at the suggestion that ‘out-of-body experiences’ might provide some support for a dualist view of people.
Body, Mind and Death in the Light of Psychic Experience. Such arguments are criticized in Antony Flew, The Logic of Mortality, chapter 10. The character of the relation between a ‘scientific’ and an ‘everyday’ picture of ourselves has an important place in Gilbert Ryle’s thinking about these issues; see The Concept of Mind, and ‘The World of Science and the Everyday World’ in his Dilemmas. 3 Other Minds 1. The need for justification John Stuart Mill writes: I conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, because, first, they have bodies like me, which I know, in my own case, to be the antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts, and other outward signs, which in my own case I know by experience to be caused by feelings.